Abstract

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme and outline a possible countermeasure.

© 2019 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement

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    [Crossref]
  53. L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
    [Crossref]
  54. Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
    [Crossref]
  55. A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
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2019 (3)

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Methods of decreasing the unambiguous state discrimination probability for subcarrier wave quantum key distribution systems,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 36(3), B16–B19 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Countermeasures for advanced unambiguous state discrimination attack on quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent states,” Phys. Scr. 94(12), 125102 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

2018 (4)

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

G. P. Miroshnichenko, A. V. Kozubov, A. A. Gaidash, A. V. Gleim, and D. B. Horoshko, “Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the collective beam-splitting attack,” Opt. Express 26(9), 11292–11308 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
[Crossref]

2017 (4)

A. V. Gleim, V. V. Chistyakov, O. I. Bannik, V. I. Egorov, N. V. Buldakov, A. B. Vasilev, A. A. Gaĭdash, A. V. Kozubov, S. V. Smirnov, S. M. Kynev, S. É. Khoruzhnikov, S. A. Kozlov, and V. N. Vasil’ev, “Sideband quantum communication at 1 Mbit/s on a metropolitan area network,” J. Opt. Technol. 84(6), 362–367 (2017).
[Crossref]

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Ø Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver,” Quantum Sci. Technol. 2(4), 044013 (2017).
[Crossref]

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

2016 (5)

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Revealing beam-splitting attack in a quantum cryptography system with a photon-number-resolving detector,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 33(7), 1451–1455 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. V. Gleim, V. I. Egorov, Y. V. Nazarov, S. V. Smirnov, V. V. Chistyakov, O. I. Bannik, A. A. Anisimov, S. M. Kynev, A. E. Ivanova, R. J. Collins, S. A. Kozlov, and G. S. Buller, “Secure polarization-independent subcarrier quantum key distribution in optical fiber channel using BB84 protocol with a strong reference,” Opt. Express 24(3), 2619 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

2015 (3)

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

2014 (3)

V. V. Chistyakov, A. V. Gleim, V. I. Egorov, and Y. V. Nazarov, “Implementation of multiplexing in a subcarrier-wave quantum cryptography system,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 541, 012078 (2014).
[Crossref]

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
[Crossref]

2013 (2)

T. Honjo, M. Fujiwara, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, H. Terai, Z. Wang, and M. Sasaki, “Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD,” Opt. Express 21(3), 2667–2673 (2013).
[Crossref]

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

2012 (3)

J. Mora, A. Ruiz-Alba, W. Amaya, A. Martínez, V. García-Muñoz, D. Calvo, and J. Capmany, “Experimental demonstration of subcarrier multiplexed quantum key distribution system,” Opt. Lett. 37(11), 2031–2033 (2012).
[Crossref]

C. M. Natarajan, M. G. Tanner, and R. H. Hadfield, “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications,” Supercond. Sci. Technol. 25(6), 063001 (2012).
[Crossref]

H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108(13), 130503 (2012).
[Crossref]

2011 (13)

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod. Opt. 58(8), 680–685 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
[Crossref]

S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, “Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys. Rev. A 83(6), 062331 (2011).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

2010 (5)

F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys. 12(11), 113026 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 800–801 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

2009 (2)

R. H. Hadfield, “Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information applications,” Nat. Photonics 3(12), 696–705 (2009).
[Crossref]

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

2008 (1)

R. Renner, “Security of quantum key distribution,” Int. J. Quantum Inform. 06(01), 1–127 (2008).
[Crossref]

2007 (1)

2006 (1)

V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A 74(2), 022313 (2006). Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[Crossref]

2005 (2)

V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems,” J. Mod. Opt. 52(5), 691–705 (2005).
[Crossref]

O. L. Guerreau, F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Quantum key distribution without a single-photon source using a strong reference,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. 17(8), 1755–1757 (2005).
[Crossref]

1999 (1)

Ahrens, J.

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Akhlaghi, M. K.

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

Amaya, W.

Anisimov, A.

S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A 74(2), 022313 (2006). Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[Crossref]

Anisimov, A. A.

Arslanov, N.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Bannik, O.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Bannik, O. I.

Bennett, C. H.

C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore, India), (New York, 1984), pp. 175–179.

Bourennane, M.

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Bourgoin, J.-P.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

Brassard, G.

C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore, India), (New York, 1984), pp. 175–179.

Bugge, A. N.

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

Buldakov, N. V.

Buller, G. S.

Calvo, D.

Cañas, G.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Capmany, J.

Cardenas, J.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Cariñe, J.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Chaiwongkhot, P.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

Chen, T.-Y.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Chen, Z.-B.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Chistyakov, V.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Chistyakov, V. V.

Collins, R. J.

Connolly, P. W. R.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Curty, M.

H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108(13), 130503 (2012).
[Crossref]

da Silva, T. F.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Dynes, J. F.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 800–801 (2010).
[Crossref]

É. Khoruzhnikov, S.

Egorov, V.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Revealing beam-splitting attack in a quantum cryptography system with a photon-number-resolving detector,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 33(7), 1451–1455 (2016).
[Crossref]

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Egorov, V. I.

Elhassan, A. M.

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Elser, D.

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

Fedorov, A.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

Figueroa, M.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Fujiwara, M.

Fung, C.-H. F.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Fürst, M.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

Gagné, M.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

Gaidash, A.

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Methods of decreasing the unambiguous state discrimination probability for subcarrier wave quantum key distribution systems,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 36(3), B16–B19 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Countermeasures for advanced unambiguous state discrimination attack on quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent states,” Phys. Scr. 94(12), 125102 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Revealing beam-splitting attack in a quantum cryptography system with a photon-number-resolving detector,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 33(7), 1451–1455 (2016).
[Crossref]

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Gaidash, A. A.

García-Muñoz, V.

Gerhardt, I.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

Ghazali, A. M. M.

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

Gilyazov, L.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Gleim, A.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Revealing beam-splitting attack in a quantum cryptography system with a photon-number-resolving detector,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 33(7), 1451–1455 (2016).
[Crossref]

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Gleim, A. V.

Goedgebuer, J.-P.

Gómez, E. S.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

González, P.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Guerreau, O. L.

O. L. Guerreau, F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Quantum key distribution without a single-photon source using a strong reference,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. 17(8), 1755–1757 (2005).
[Crossref]

Hadfield, R. H.

C. M. Natarajan, M. G. Tanner, and R. H. Hadfield, “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications,” Supercond. Sci. Technol. 25(6), 063001 (2012).
[Crossref]

R. H. Hadfield, “Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information applications,” Nat. Photonics 3(12), 696–705 (2009).
[Crossref]

Hjelme, D. R.

V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems,” J. Mod. Opt. 52(5), 691–705 (2005).
[Crossref]

Honjo, T.

Horoshko, D. B.

Huang, A.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

Ivanova, A. E.

Jain, N.

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

Jennewein, T.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

Jiang, M.-S.

S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, “Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys. Rev. A 83(6), 062331 (2011).
[Crossref]

Jogenfors, J.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Kaiser, S.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

Kashyap, R.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

Koehler-Sidki, A.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Kozlov, S.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Kozlov, S. A.

Kozubov, A.

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Countermeasures for advanced unambiguous state discrimination attack on quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent states,” Phys. Scr. 94(12), 125102 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Methods of decreasing the unambiguous state discrimination probability for subcarrier wave quantum key distribution systems,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 36(3), B16–B19 (2019).
[Crossref]

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Kozubov, A. V.

Krauss, H.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

Kurochkin, Y.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

Kurtsiefer, C.

Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, “Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel,” Opt. Express 15(15), 9388–9393 (2007).
[Crossref]

Kynev, S.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

Kynev, S. M.

Lamas-Linares, A.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, “Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel,” Opt. Express 15(15), 9388–9393 (2007).
[Crossref]

Larsson, J.-Å.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Legré, M.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

Leuchs, G.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

Liang, L.-M.

S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, “Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys. Rev. A 83(6), 062331 (2011).
[Crossref]

Lima, G.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Liu, Q.

Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

Liu, Y.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Liu, Z.

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
[Crossref]

Lo, H.-K.

H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108(13), 130503 (2012).
[Crossref]

F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys. 12(11), 113026 (2010).
[Crossref]

Lucamarini, M.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Lütkenhaus, N.

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

Lydersen, L.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod. Opt. 58(8), 680–685 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

Ma, X.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Majedi, A. H.

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

Makarov, V.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
[Crossref]

Ø Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver,” Quantum Sci. Technol. 2(4), 044013 (2017).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod. Opt. 58(8), 680–685 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A 74(2), 022313 (2006). Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems,” J. Mod. Opt. 52(5), 691–705 (2005).
[Crossref]

Malassenet, F. J.

O. L. Guerreau, F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Quantum key distribution without a single-photon source using a strong reference,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. 17(8), 1755–1757 (2005).
[Crossref]

Marøy, Ø

Ø Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver,” Quantum Sci. Technol. 2(4), 044013 (2017).
[Crossref]

Marøy, Ø.

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

Marquardt, C.

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

Martínez, A.

Mazurenko, Y.

McLaughlin, S. W.

O. L. Guerreau, F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Quantum key distribution without a single-photon source using a strong reference,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. 17(8), 1755–1757 (2005).
[Crossref]

Melnik, K.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Merolla, J.-M.

O. L. Guerreau, F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “Quantum key distribution without a single-photon source using a strong reference,” IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. 17(8), 1755–1757 (2005).
[Crossref]

Mérolla, J.-M.

Miki, S.

Minshull, C.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

Miroshnichenko, G.

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Methods of decreasing the unambiguous state discrimination probability for subcarrier wave quantum key distribution systems,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 36(3), B16–B19 (2019).
[Crossref]

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Countermeasures for advanced unambiguous state discrimination attack on quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent states,” Phys. Scr. 94(12), 125102 (2019).
[Crossref]

Miroshnichenko, G. P.

Moiseev, S.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Monat, L.

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

Mora, J.

Natarajan, C. M.

C. M. Natarajan, M. G. Tanner, and R. H. Hadfield, “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications,” Supercond. Sci. Technol. 25(6), 063001 (2012).
[Crossref]

Nauerth, S.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

Nazarov, Y. V.

Pan, J.-W.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Pappa, A.

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

Peng, C.-Z.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Przysiezna, A.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Qi, B.

H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108(13), 130503 (2012).
[Crossref]

F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys. 12(11), 113026 (2010).
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Qin, X.

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
[Crossref]

Radchenko, I.

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
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Rau, M.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
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R. Renner, “Security of quantum key distribution,” Int. J. Quantum Inform. 06(01), 1–127 (2008).
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Rhodes, W. T.

Roberts, G. L.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
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Ruiz-Alba, A.

Sajeed, S.

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
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A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
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S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
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Sasaki, M.

Sauge, S.

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
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S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
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Schmitt-Manderbach, T.

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

Sharpe, A. W.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Shields, A. J.

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 800–801 (2010).
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Shimizu, K.

Skaar, J.

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
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Ø Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver,” Quantum Sci. Technol. 2(4), 044013 (2017).
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Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
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A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express 19(23), 23590–23600 (2011).
[Crossref]

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod. Opt. 58(8), 680–685 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
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V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A 74(2), 022313 (2006). Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
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Smirnov, S.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
[Crossref]

Smirnov, S. V.

Soucarros, M.

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
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Sun, S.-H.

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
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S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, “Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys. Rev. A 83(6), 062331 (2011).
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Tamaki, K.

Tang, Y.-L.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
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C. M. Natarajan, M. G. Tanner, and R. H. Hadfield, “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications,” Supercond. Sci. Technol. 25(6), 063001 (2012).
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Terai, H.

Vallone, G.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
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Vasil’ev, V. N.

Vasilev, A. B.

Vasiliev, A.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

Vera, N.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
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Villoresi, P.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
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Volkova, K.

S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
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Wang, H.

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
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Wang, J.

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
[Crossref]

Wang, Z.

Wei, Z.

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
[Crossref]

Weier, H.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

Weinfurter, H.

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
[Crossref]

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

Wiechers, C.

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
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C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

Wittmann, C.

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express 18(26), 27938–27954 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

Xavier, G. B.

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

Xu, F.

F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys. 12(11), 113026 (2010).
[Crossref]

Yamashita, T.

Yin, H.-L.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Yong, H.-L.

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Yuan, Z.

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

Yuan, Z. L.

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 800–801 (2010).
[Crossref]

Zhang, Z.

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
[Crossref]

Appl. Phys. Lett. (3)

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 98(23), 231104 (2011).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196101 (2011).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Reply to "comment on ’resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography’",” Appl. Phys. Lett. 99(19), 196102 (2011).
[Crossref]

Eur. Phys. J. D (1)

J. Wang, H. Wang, X. Qin, Z. Wei, and Z. Zhang, “The countermeasures against the blinding attack in quantum key distribution,” Eur. Phys. J. D 70(1), 5 (2016).
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IEEE J. Quantum Electron. (1)

A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption,” IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 52(11), 1–11 (2016).
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IEEE Photonics Technol. Lett. (1)

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Int. J. Quantum Inform. (1)

R. Renner, “Security of quantum key distribution,” Int. J. Quantum Inform. 06(01), 1–127 (2008).
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J. Mod. Opt. (2)

L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod. Opt. 58(8), 680–685 (2011).
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V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems,” J. Mod. Opt. 52(5), 691–705 (2005).
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J. Opt. Soc. Am. B (2)

J. Opt. Technol. (1)

J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. (2)

V. V. Chistyakov, A. V. Gleim, V. I. Egorov, and Y. V. Nazarov, “Implementation of multiplexing in a subcarrier-wave quantum cryptography system,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 541, 012078 (2014).
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S. Kynev, V. Chistyakov, S. Smirnov, K. Volkova, V. Egorov, and A. Gleim, “Free-space subcarrier wave quantum communication,” J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 917, 052003 (2017).
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Laser Phys. Lett. (1)

A. Fedorov, I. Gerhardt, A. Huang, J. Jogenfors, Y. Kurochkin, A. Lamas-Linares, J.-Å. Larsson, G. Leuchs, L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett. 15 095203),” Laser Phys. Lett. 16(1), 019401 (2019).
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Nat. Commun. (1)

I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2(1), 349 (2011).
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Nat. Photonics (4)

R. H. Hadfield, “Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information applications,” Nat. Photonics 3(12), 696–705 (2009).
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L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4(10), 686–689 (2010).
[Crossref]

Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 800–801 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Reply to ‘Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD’,” Nat. Photonics 4(12), 801 (2010).
[Crossref]

New J. Phys. (5)

S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 11(6), 065001 (2009).
[Crossref]

F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” New J. Phys. 12(11), 113026 (2010).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys. 13(11), 113042 (2011).
[Crossref]

C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New J. Phys. 13(1), 013043 (2011).
[Crossref]

H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors,” New J. Phys. 13(7), 073024 (2011).
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Opt. Express (6)

Opt. Lett. (2)

Phys. Rev. A (11)

A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation,” Phys. Rev. A 98(2), 022327 (2018).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84(3), 032320 (2011).
[Crossref]

G. Cañas, N. Vera, J. Cariñe, P. González, J. Cardenas, P. W. R. Connolly, A. Przysiezna, E. S. Gómez, M. Figueroa, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima, “High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over multicore telecommunication fibers,” Phys. Rev. A 96(2), 022317 (2017).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legré, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing,” Phys. Rev. A 91(3), 032326 (2015).
[Crossref]

L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 83(3), 032306 (2011).
[Crossref]

S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, “Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys. Rev. A 83(6), 062331 (2011).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage,” Phys. Rev. A 94(3), 030302 (2016).
[Crossref]

A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states,” Phys. Rev. A 98(1), 012330 (2018).
[Crossref]

V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A 74(2), 022313 (2006). Erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[Crossref]

S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, “Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,” Phys. Rev. A 91(6), 062301 (2015).
[Crossref]

Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, Y. Liu, H.-L. Yong, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information,” Phys. Rev. A 88(2), 022308 (2013).
[Crossref]

Phys. Rev. Appl. (1)

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. L. Roberts, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Best-practice criteria for practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Appl. 9(4), 044027 (2018).
[Crossref]

Phys. Rev. Lett. (3)

A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 112(7), 070503 (2014).
[Crossref]

N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 107(11), 110501 (2011).
[Crossref]

H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108(13), 130503 (2012).
[Crossref]

Phys. Scr. (1)

A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, and G. Miroshnichenko, “Countermeasures for advanced unambiguous state discrimination attack on quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent states,” Phys. Scr. 94(12), 125102 (2019).
[Crossref]

Quantum Sci. Technol. (1)

Ø Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, “Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver,” Quantum Sci. Technol. 2(4), 044013 (2017).
[Crossref]

Rev. Sci. Instrum. (1)

Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, and J. Skaar, “A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector,” Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85(1), 013108 (2014).
[Crossref]

Sci. Adv. (1)

J. Jogenfors, A. M. Elhassan, J. Ahrens, M. Bourennane, and J.-Å. Larsson, “Hacking the Bell test using classical light in energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution,” Sci. Adv. 1(11), e1500793 (2015).
[Crossref]

Supercond. Sci. Technol. (1)

C. M. Natarajan, M. G. Tanner, and R. H. Hadfield, “Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors: physics and applications,” Supercond. Sci. Technol. 25(6), 063001 (2012).
[Crossref]

Other (3)

ID210 infrared single-photon detector datasheet, https://marketing.idquantique.com/acton/attachment/11868/f-0239/1/-/-/-/-/ID210_Brochure.pdf , visited 11 Oct 2019.

C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore, India), (New York, 1984), pp. 175–179.

O. Bannik, V. Chistyakov, L. Gilyazov, K. Melnik, A. Vasiliev, N. Arslanov, A. Gaidash, A. Kozubov, V. Egorov, S. Kozlov, A. Gleim, and S. Moiseev, “Multinode subcarrier wave quantum communication network,” (2017). presentation at International conference on quantum cryptography QCrypt 2017, Cambridge, UK, 18–22 September 2017.

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Figures (5)

Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Experimental setup for testing the detector. L, laser; AWG, arbitrary waveform generator; VOA, variable optical attenuator; OPM, optical power meter; OEC, optical-to-electrical converter; OSC, oscilloscope; APD, avalanche photodiode single-photon detector ID Quantique ID210.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Oscillograms of the APD gate signal (provided at ID210 front-panel output) and the optical trigger pulse. Their relative timing is shown here as an assumption. The optical pulse width shown is limited by the bandwidth of OEC, i.e., the actual pulse is shorter.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Detector click probability in the blinded regime as a function of control pulse energy.
Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Click thresholds of investigated ID210 detector under different blinding powers. $E_\textrm {always}$ is a minimum pulse energy at which the detector always clicks and $E_\textrm {never}$ is a maximum energy when it never clicks. Shaded area shows the range of trigger pulse energies $E_\textrm {trigger}$ of the perfect attack (limited above by $2 E_\textrm {never}$).
Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Subcarrier-wave QKD scheme. Components shaded red (gray) are introduced as a countermeasure. PSM, electro-optical phase shift modulator; ATT, optical attenuator; C, circulator; SF, spectral filter; APD, avalanche photodiode; M, fiber-optic mirror; D, photodetector. Insets show optical spectra at different points.

Tables (1)

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Table 1. Parameters for successful control of ID210 detector in SCW QKD scheme.

Equations (1)

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E always E trigger 2 E never .

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